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STATE V. LOVEJOY:  SHOULD PRE-ARREST, PRE-
MIRANDA SILENCE BE ADMISSIBLE DURING THE 
STATE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF AS SUBSTANTIVE 
EVIDENCE OF GUILT? 
Mark Rucci* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution reads in part that “[t]he accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, property or privileges . . . .”1  Further, the Law Court has held that 
“the State constitutional protection against self-incrimination is the equivalent of 
the Fifth Amendment.”2  However, as with most provisions of the Constitution, the 
protection against self-incrimination is open to interpretation.3  While the Supreme 
Court has answered some questions surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s 
protections,4 it has left many decisions regarding its scope largely within the 
purview of the states.5  As a result, The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, like many 
courts across the United States, has struggled to qualify exactly how Maine’s 
codification of the Fifth Amendment applies outside of the courtroom.6   
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law.  The author wishes to thank 
Professor Dmitry Bam and his colleagues on the Maine Law Review for their invaluable support and 
meaningful critique of this Note.  The author would also like to thank his loving family and friends, 
whose support made the publication of this work possible.  This note is dedicated in loving memory of 
Yvette Deabay, Mary Rucci, and Andrea Robinson, three amazing women who proved that nothing is 
insurmountable when approached with a positive attitude. 
 1. Me. Const. art I, § 6. 
 2. State v. Vickers, 309 A.2d 324, 326 (Me. 1973) (citing State v. Castonguay, 240 A.2d 747, 753 
(Me. 1968)). 
 3. See generally Frank S. Ward, Constitutional Law—United States v. McCann: Is the Fifth 
Amendment Violated when Pre-Arrest Silence is used as Substantive Evidence of a Criminal 
Defendant’s Guilt, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC., 269 (2004); see Fifth Amendment at Trial, 40 GEO. L.J. 
643, 645-49 (2011) (stating that in applying the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has had to 
interpret the meaning of the terms “compulsion” and “testimony,” as well as decide what types of 
statements are incriminating). 
 4. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (holding that an individual’s privilege against 
self-incrimination is at risk any time he is “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by 
the authorities . . . and is subjected to questioning . . . .”  Thus, the Court found that unless certain 
procedural safeguards were adhered to, such statements would be inadmissible in court proceedings.). 
 5. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (stating that, despite its holding, each 
jurisdiction was free to limit or otherwise ban the use of silence for impeachment purposes); see Salinas 
v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (declining to answer a question regarding the admissibility of 
pre-custodial silence because the defendant never invoked his privilege). 
 6. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240 (limiting the Court’s holding to pre-arrest silence used for 
impeachment and stating that its decision is not binding on the states); see State v. Millay, 2001 ME 
177, ¶¶ 15-16, 787 A.2d 129 (holding that Millay’s performance on a sobriety test was admissible as 
non-testimonial evidence, and that his statement that he had “been through it before” was testimonial, 
but was admissible because it was not coerced); see United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1456 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to resident aliens who 
face charges in other countries); see Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (stating that a 
suspect in a voluntary interview needed to expressly state that he was asserting his Fifth Amendment 
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Specifically, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used during the prosecution’s case-in-chief as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt in a criminal trial.7  Further, the circuit courts 
that have addressed the issue are split.8  As a result, jurisdictions have been forced 
to fashion their own rules regarding the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence as evidence of consciousness of guilt.  It was against this backdrop that the 
Law Court decided State v. Lovejoy.9   
The purpose of this case note is to analyze Lovejoy and how it fits into the 
existing body of case law regarding pre-arrest statements and their admissibility in 
court.  Part II of this note briefly discusses the scope of the Fifth Amendment to 
help elucidate the rationale behind courts’ decisions to either admit or exclude pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda testimony at trial.  Part III of this note discusses Lovejoy in 
some detail, explaining the facts, procedural posture, and holding of the case, 
including a detailed analysis of the Court’s reasoning and the precedent upon which 
it relied. Part IV discusses how other courts have addressed the admissibility of 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.  Finally, Part V argues that the Court’s ruling in 
Lovejoy is the correct interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 
of the Maine Constitution as it applies to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, as any 
comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda decision to remain silent 
implicates the Fifth Amendment,10 has minimal probative value,11 and should be 
precluded by a logical extension of the Griffin penalty doctrine.12 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment is at the heart of the debate over the admissibility of 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Accordingly, it is helpful to understand a little bit 
about the Amendment’s protections.  The portion of the Fifth Amendment that is 
relevant to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence states that no person “shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”13  While on its face the 
                                                                                                     
privilege, but not deciding whether the underlying basis for that assertion—his silence—would have 
been protected). 
 7. See State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 21, 89 A.3d 1066 (citing Salinas, 133 S. Ct.  at 2180). 
 8. See Michael J. Hunter, The Man on the Stairs Who Wasn’t There: What Does a Defendant’s 
Pre-Arrest Silence Have to do with Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, or Due Process?, 28 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 277, 280 (2005). 
 9. 2014 ME 48, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 10. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 139 (2001) (quoting Tortolito v. State, 
901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995)) (“[W]e discern no rational reason to limit the protection embracing the 
citizen’s right to silence to the post-arrest or post-Miranda situation.  The constitutional right to silence 
exists all the time—before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it.  The 
right is self-executing.”). 
 11. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 12. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (holding that to allow a prosecutor to 
comment on a defendant’s failure to testify is to attach a penalty to a defendant’s assertion of a 
constitutional right).   
 13. Cornell University Law School, Fifth Amendment: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); see Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination is “fixed in 
our Constitution . . . [and was] ‘secured for ages to come and . . . designed to approach immortality as 
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Amendment arguably only pertains to the courtroom, the Supreme Court in 
Miranda v. Arizona14 extended the scope of the Amendment to any situation 
involving the inhibition of freedom, whether inside the courtroom or out.15  In that 
case, the Court held that a suspect must be warned of specific rights in clear terms 
in order for the mandates of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination to be satisfied.16  While the 
prophylactic tool adopted in Miranda was designed to curb police coercion and 
questionable practices in eliciting confessions, the questions then become when, 
whether, and how these warnings must be given.17   
The Supreme Court has held that “the protection of the privilege reaches an 
accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of 
responses which are also communications . . . .”18  In addition, the Court held in 
Griffin v. California that commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial is 
impermissible, as it constitutes “a penalty imposed by courts for asserting a 
constitutional privilege.”19  However, prosecutors are permitted to use evidence of 
a defendant’s silence during cross-examination for impeachment purposes.20  In 
addition, in order for the Fifth Amendment to be implicated, the accused’s 
statements must be both “testimonial”21 and the product of “compulsion” within the 
Amendment’s meaning.22  While the Supreme Court has not spelled out an 
exhaustive definition of what constitutes a testimonial statement, they have noted 
that, in the absence of an ongoing emergency, “[statements] are testimonial when 
the circumstances objectively indicate[] that . . . the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”23  In addition, the Court has stated that the term 
interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
                                                                                                     
nearly as human institutions can approach it’”) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821)); 
see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the protection against self-incrimination 
against the states). 
 14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 15. Cornell University Law School, supra note 13. 
 16. See Gordon L. Rockhill, Custodial Interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, 23 AM. JUR. 2D 713 
Proof of Facts § 2 (1980). 
 17. See id. §§ 1-2 (questions have arisen regarding what constitutes custodial interrogation and 
when the warnings must be given). 
 18. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). 
 19. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
 20. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). 
 21. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination protects 
only an individual’s right to not be “compelled to testify against himself”); see Doe v. United States, 
487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (stating that in order to be testimonial, “an accused’s communication must 
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.  Only then is a person 
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”); see Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) 
(holding that a gunshot victim’s identification and description of a witness was non-testimonial when 
the primary purpose of the police’s investigation was to assist in an emergency). 
 22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). 
 23. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (dealing with testimonial statements in the 
context of the emergency doctrine). 
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response from the suspect.”24  Finally, the focus of this inquiry is on the 
“perceptions of the suspect.”25 
In constructing a definition for compelled statements, the Court stated that in 
order for the government to satisfy the constitutional mandate laid forth in the Fifth 
Amendment, “[p]roof must be adequate to establish that . . . the making of the 
statement was voluntary.”26  The import of this standard is that if a defendant 
should utter a statement that, but for “improper influence” he would not have made, 
that statement can neither be constitutionally permissible nor appropriate for 
admission.27   
In issuing its opinions, the Court has sought to clarify both the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections and how its requirements may be satisfied.28  However, 
in light of the Court’s hesitance to address the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt,29 a lower court’s 
definition of compulsion has often determined whether such evidence will be ruled 
admissible under the Fifth Amendment.30  With this short synopsis of the scope of 
the Fifth Amendment in mind, the issues at play in State v. Lovejoy can be better 
understood. 
III.  STATE V. LOVEJOY31 
A.  Background of Lovejoy 
In State v. Lovejoy, defendant Lovejoy’s daughter told a friend that Lovejoy 
had molested her.32  The Portland Police began an investigation and located 
Lovejoy, who was living in North Carolina.33  A detective for the department called 
                                                                                                     
 24. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897)).   
 27. Id. (citation omitted). 
 28. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (holding that it was error for the 
prosecutor to use defendant’s post-Miranda silence at trial as evidence to refute his claim of insanity); 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (stating that a defendant’s post-arrest silence in the wake of 
receiving his Miranda rights is nothing more than his assertion that he intends to exercise his right, and 
that such silence cannot be used for impeachment on cross-examination); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 
96, 104 (1975) (“[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to 
remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously 
honored.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 29. In Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), it looked as though the Supreme Court was primed 
to settle the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was admissible in court as substantive 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt.  However, the Court sidestepped the issue, holding that in order to rely 
on the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant had to invoke it.  Id. at 2184.  Since the 
defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the station and answered questions until “balk[ing]” at a 
question about the ballistics analysis of shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime, the Court held 
that the defendant did not specifically invoke the Fifth Amendment and was not entitled to its 
protection.  Id. at 2177-79. 
 30. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment only prohibits “compelled self-incrimination”) (emphasis added). 
 31. 2014 ME 48, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 32. Id. ¶ 3. 
 33. Id. 
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Lovejoy one or two times, and Lovejoy denied the allegations, stating that he 
wanted to speak with his attorney.34  Lovejoy thereafter ceased returning phone 
calls.35  Ultimately, he was charged with two counts of gross sexual assault, a class 
A crime.36  During the State’s direct examination of the police detective who had 
contacted Lovejoy, defense counsel requested a sidebar conference and asked that 
the detective be instructed not to mention Lovejoy’s statement, made during one of 
the detective’s calls, that he would like to speak with his attorney.37  The request 
was granted, but Lovejoy’s counsel never sought to prevent testimony that Lovejoy 
thereafter refused to speak with the detective or return his phone calls.38  The 
detective subsequently testified that Lovejoy did not return his calls.39   
At closing, the prosecutor again referenced Lovejoy’s refusal to return phone 
calls, stating that the jury should consider this as evidence of Defendant’s 
“consciousness of guilt.”40  At the end of the prosecutor’s closing argument, 
Lovejoy moved for a mistrial.41  The motion was denied, and the judge instead 
issued a curative instruction.42  Lovejoy was convicted by the jury and raised two 
issues on appeal, including “the admissibility of evidence concerning Lovejoy’s 
silence when approached by the police before his arrest . . . .”43 
In a unanimous decision, the Law Court held that Lovejoy’s pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence could not be used at trial as evidence of his consciousness of guilt 
without violating the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 
I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution.44   
B.  Discussion of the Fifth Amendment Implications of Lovejoy’s Silence  
At the outset, the Court in Lovejoy noted that the Fifth Amendment 
unquestionably prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on “a defendant’s decision 
not to testify at his criminal trial.”45  With regard to police interaction outside of the 
courtroom, the Court noted that its decisions have long recognized that the Fifth 
Amendment protects individuals against “compelled self-incrimination both before 
and after arrest.”46  Specifically, the Court in State v. Diaz ruled inadmissible 
testimony from a police officer that when he questioned a defendant about his 
connection to a motor vehicle accident, the defendant stated that he thought it 
unwise to answer the officer’s questions.47  In that case, the Court relied on Doyle 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. ¶ 2. 
 37. Id. ¶ 6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. ¶ 7. 
 40. Id. ¶ 8. 
 41. Id. ¶ 10.  Defense counsel’s motion was based on the fact that the prosecutor had impermissibly 
spoken to the victim’s credibility as a witness, an issue that was raised on appeal, but that we do not 
reach for the purposes of this case note.  Id. 
 42. See id. ¶ 12. 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. 
 44. Id. ¶ 27. 
 45. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting State v. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 15, 50 A.3d 544). 
 46. Id. ¶ 22 (citing State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 468 (Me. 1996)). 
 47. Diaz, 681 A.2d at 467. 
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v. Ohio,48 in which the Supreme Court stated that the Due Process Clause prevents 
a state from introducing testimony which makes reference to a “[d]efendant’s 
invocation of the right to remain silent.”49  While the Court still had to find that the 
error could not be considered harmless,50 in that case the prosecutor twice 
emphasized Diaz’s failure to answer the trooper’s question.51   
The issue in Lovejoy was slightly different than that raised in Diaz.  In 
Lovejoy, it was the defendant’s silence, rather than a statement, that was used 
against him at trial.  However, the Court noted that Lovejoy “specifically 
terminated communication by first telling the investigating detective that he wanted 
to speak with a lawyer and then remaining silent by not returning the detective’s 
telephone calls.”52  The Court stated that Lovejoy exercised his Fifth Amendment 
right by ending his telephone conversation with the detective, stating that he 
wanted to speak with his attorney, and refusing to answer subsequent phone calls.53  
Finally, as in Diaz:54 
Because the prosecutor . . . sought to capitalize on the improperly admitted 
testimony of Lovejoy’s failure to respond to the police detective by arguing that it 
demonstrated Lovejoy’s consciousness of guilt, the testimony and argument 
constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the 
Maine Constitution.55 
In addition, while the claim in Lovejoy was reviewed only for obvious error,56 
the Court concluded that the error at issue in this case was “sufficiently prejudicial 
that it could have affected the outcome of the proceeding.”57  The Court relied on 
its holding in Diaz to find plain error58 and concluded that the error in this case 
“affect[ed] substantial rights.”59  Specifically, the Court found that where the 
evidence impermissibly elicited from the detective at trial was emphasized in 
closing, and where there was no physical evidence linking Lovejoy to the crime, 
                                                                                                     
 48. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
 49. Diaz, 681 A.2d at 468 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976)). 
 50. Id. at 469 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (holding that an error can only 
be considered harmless if the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that “that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the trial”); see also State v. Patton, 2012 ME 101, ¶ 18, 50 A.3d 544 (Though the 
State conceded error regarding the admission of Patton’s pre-arrest statement that he would like to speak 
with his attorney, that error was harmless, as the prosecutor did not seek to capitalize on the testimony 
as establishing the defendant’s guilt.  Indeed, it was never suggested that the statement should be viewed 
in any way as evidence of guilt.). 
 51. Diaz, 681 A.2d at 469. 
 52. State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 24, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 53. Id. ¶ 26. 
 54. Diaz, 681 A.2d at 469. 
 55. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 27, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 56. Id. ¶ 19.  Lovejoy’s counsel failed to object to both the detective’s testimony and the 
prosecutor’s remarks at closing.  Thus, the Court state that it would review only for obvious error.  
 57. Id. ¶ 28. 
 58. Id.; see also Diaz, 681 A.2d at 469 (holding that the court could not be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not affect the outcome of the trial, when the 
prosecution twice relied on the inadmissible testimony of Diaz and when the Court refused to give an 
instruction that the jury “must not draw any adverse inference from the fact that a person has exercised 
[the right not to answer]”). 
 59. Id. ¶ 28. 
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the trial thus turned solely on the credibility of witnesses.60  Finally, the Court 
stated that Lovejoy’s assertion of the protection against self-incrimination, along 
with the improper admission of his silence at trial, “seriously affect[ed] the fairness 
and integrity . . . of judicial proceedings.”61  Specifically, while the jury was 
instructed that Defendant’s decision not to testify could not be used against him, no 
such instruction was issued regarding his pre-arrest silence, which was also 
implicated by the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the Maine 
Constitution.62  Thus, Lovejoy’s convictions were vacated.63 
IV.  APPROACHES 
A.  The Rationale for Excluding Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence 
In deciding State v. Lovejoy, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court seemed to 
subscribe to the analysis that: 
Disclosing a defendant’s choice to remain silent during the pre-arrest stage will 
lead the jury to infer guilt.  As a result, . . . comments upon a defendant’s silence 
compel an individual to speak or otherwise incriminate herself, which the Supreme 
Court prohibits.64   
The Court in Lovejoy was particularly concerned about the prejudice a 
defendant is likely to suffer when a prosecutor is allowed to rely on the accused’s 
silence to state explicitly that such silence is probative of guilt.65  This strategy is 
particularly prejudicial to the defendant, as the evidence is not simply admitted at 
trial, but will often be leaned on heavily as part of the State’s case-in-chief, thereby 
eroding the values of the adversarial system.66  Where the defendant has chosen not 
to testify, and thus has not exposed himself to the possibility of impeachment, it 
seems implicitly unfair to fashion his lack of testimony as substantive evidence of 
his guilt.67  Allowing introduction of the testimony forces a defendant to make the 
impossible choice between having either his silence or his testimony used against 
him at trial.68 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. ¶ 29. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. ¶ 33. 
 64. Adam M. Stewart, Note, The Silent Domino: Allowing Pre-Arrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt 
and the Possible Effect on Miranda, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 189, 199 (2004) (citing Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965)). 
 65. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 28, 89 A.3d 1066 (“[T]he evidence not only was offered at trial but also 
was emphasized in closing arguments in a case in which there was no physical evidence linking Lovejoy 
to the crime and the verdict turned entirely on the credibility of the witnesses.”). 
 66. Jane Elinor Notz, Comment, Prearrest Silence As Evidence of Guilt: What You Don’t Say 
Shouldn’t Be Used Against You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1034 (1997) (stating that a defendant is more 
likely to speak if he knows his silence will be used against him, thus creating something akin to an 
inquisitorial system of justice). 
 67. See Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden: A Case Against the Use of a 
Defendant’s Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 398 (2006) 
(“[P]ermitting the prosecution to use post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt 
forces the defendant into [a] no-win situation . . . .”). 
 68. Skrapka, supra note 67, at 398. 
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An additional concern is that “the Fifth Amendment, in conjunction with 
Miranda, implies the government’s promise to respect the defendant’s decision to 
remain silent.”69  The rationale here is that regardless of whether a defendant has 
been arrested, once he has exercised his constitutional right to remain silent, any 
comment on his silence at trial is violative of the Fifth Amendment.70  Although 
that rationale arguably only applies to post-Miranda invocations of the right to 
remain silent, there are compelling reasons why Miranda should not serve as the 
arbitrary dividing line between those statements that may be used against a 
defendant in court and those that may not.71  Notably, allowing Miranda to serve as 
the dividing line would encourage police to wait on giving Miranda warnings for 
as long as possible so as to increase their chances of gathering incriminating 
statements.72  Another rationale is that allowing Miranda to serve as the dividing 
line undermines the function of our adversarial system of justice by encouraging 
police to rely on defendants as key sources of evidence.73  If defendants know that 
their silence can be used against them in court, they are more likely to speak with 
police.74   
The final rationale for the exclusion of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is that 
such evidence has minimal probative value.75  This is because there are any number 
of reasons that a defendant might wish to remain silent before arrest that have 
nothing to do with guilt, including “fear that his story may not be believed,”76 or 
simply not having heard the question.77  Citing various rationales, the First,78 
Sixth,79 Seventh,80 and Tenth81 Circuits have ruled that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
                                                                                                     
 69. Stewart, supra note 64, at 199 (citing Michael R. Patrick, Note, Toward the Constitutional 
Protection of a Non-Testifying Defendant’s Prearrest Silence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 897, 935 (1997)). 
 70. Stewart, supra note 64, at 199. 
 71. See Notz, supra note 66, at 1033-34; see also Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) 
(stating that “comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal 
justice,’ which the Fifth Amendment outlaws”) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). 
 72. Notz, supra note 66, at 1033.  
 73. Notz supra note 66, at 1034. 
 74. Notz, supra note 66, at 1034. 
 75. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Aaron R. Pettit, Comment, Should the Prosecution be Allowed to Comment on a Defendant’s 
Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-In-Chief?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 219 (1997) (citing United States v. 
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975)). 
 78. Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989) (relying on Griffin for the proposition 
that the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment rights by stating that he would not confess and 
thereafter remaining silent). 
 79. Combs, 205 F.3d at 283 (stating that the Fifth Amendment has been given a broad scope and 
that, due to the potential damage to a defendant if his pre-arrest statements were admitted at trial, the 
privilege against self-incrimination applies). 
 80. United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that Griffin 
covers pre-arrest silence, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination attaches 
prior to “formal adversary proceedings”). 
 81. United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that Griffin applies to 
pre-arrest interrogation, but holding that the admission of the violative testimony in this case constituted 
harmless error). 
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silence is not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.82  While even in these 
jurisdictions the harmless error test can prove to be a significant hurdle to fully 
realizing the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment,83 these courts have 
recognized that allowing pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is potentially very 
damaging.84 
B.  The Rationale for Allowing Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence: Jenkins v. 
Anderson 
While the Law Court’s decision in State v. Lovejoy was unanimous in 
excluding evidence of Lovejoy’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for use in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, not all courts have taken this approach.  In fact, the 
circuit courts that have addressed the issue are split.85  After all, it would seem 
intuitive that refusal to cooperate with a police investigation is highly probative of 
guilt.86  The temptation to use a defendant’s silence against him at trial is nowhere 
more evident than in State v. Lovejoy.  There, police informed Lovejoy that his 
daughter had accused him of molestation.87  Intuitively, it would seem that if 
Lovejoy were innocent of the crime, he would want to assist the police, both to 
clear his name and to help his troubled daughter, who was at least potentially the 
victim of sexual abuse at the hands of another.  Accordingly, there are a number of 
competing interests and rationales for admitting evidence of a defendant’s silence 
during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.88   
Many courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jenkins v. 
Anderson89 in determining that a defendant’s pre-arrest statements are admissible 
during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.90  In Jenkins, the defendant was accused of 
stabbing and killing Doyle Redding.91  He turned himself in to police and at trial 
contended that the stabbing had been in self-defense.92  During cross-examination, 
the prosecutor impeached Jenkins by eliciting testimony that he had not waited at 
the scene of the crime for the police to arrive after the stabbing occurred, and that 
he had waited two weeks before reporting the stabbing to anyone.93  As in Lovejoy, 
the prosecutor referenced Jenkins’ silence (again, in a closing argument), stating 
that the defendant waited two weeks before speaking with anyone about the 
stabbing.94 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 197-98 n.80. 
 83. Burson, 952 F.2d at 1201 (stating that the impermissible testimony by two IRS agents regarding 
defendant’s pre-arrest silence was harmless error because the evidence against the defendant was 
overwhelming and the testimony did not contribute to the guilty verdict). 
 84. See Combs 205 F.3d at 283 (noting the damaging evidence that could potentially be admitted if 
evidence of pre-arrest silence were admissible as substantive evidence of guilt). 
 85. Hunter, supra note 8, at 280.  
 86. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 279. 
 87. State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 3, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 88. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 200-01. 
 89. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
 90. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 200. 
 91. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232 (1980). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 233. 
 94. Id. at 234. 
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The Court held that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s silence during 
impeachment did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.95  In so holding, the Court reasoned that the “impeachment 
follow[ed] the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and 
advance[d] the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.”96  The Court further 
stated that, unlike in Doyle v. Ohio, where the defendant elected to remain silent 
after receiving his Miranda warnings, here “no governmental action induced 
petitioner to remain silent before arrest.”97  “Consequently, the fundamental 
unfairness present in Doyle [was] not present in this case.”98  However, the Court in 
Jenkins limited its holding to impeachment, stating that a prosecutor could use pre-
arrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility.99  The Court did not address the 
issue of whether post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence could be used during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, and that issue remains unresolved today.100  This lack 
of guidance led to the split in the circuit courts with regard to the use of pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.101 
Writing a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens referenced his dissent in Doyle 
and stated that when a defendant chooses to remain silent in the pre-arrest context, 
his silence is probative and does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.102  Justice 
Stevens reasoned that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to “protect the 
defendant from being compelled to testify against himself at his own trial.”103  
Thus, in an extension of the Court’s holding, Justice Stevens reasoned that 
Miranda contains no implicit assurance that a defendant’s silence will not be used 
against him at trial.104  He further noted that where a defendant is under no 
compulsion to speak or to remain silent, his decision to do one or the other “[does 
not] raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment.”105  The question of admissibility 
instead turns on considerations of the evidence’s probative value.106  While Justice 
Stevens’ rationale rested on a significantly limited view of the Fifth Amendment’s 
protections outside of the courtroom, both his opinion and that of the majority 
seemed to focus to some extent on the lack of compulsion or government 
coercion.107 
Many lower courts have also founded their admission of such evidence on the 
fact that the Fifth Amendment functions only to prohibit the admission of 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at 240. 
 96. Id. at 238. 
 97. Id. at 239-40. 
 98. Id.; see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (stating that the prosecutor’s use of post-
Miranda silence to impeach defendants who did not mention their exculpatory story until trial was 
impermissible.  The Court reasoned that implicit in the Miranda warnings is the promise that a 
defendant’s subsequent silence pursuant to the warning “will carry no penalty,” such as use against that 
defendant in later proceedings.). 
 99. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. 
 100. Skrapka, supra note 67, at 359-60. 
 101. See Hunter, supra note 8 at 280. 
 102. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-44 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 242. 
 104. See id. at 244. 
 105. Id. at 243-44. 
 106. Id. at 244. 
 107. See id. at 235, 241 (stating that the defendant “voluntarily took the stand in his own defense”). 
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“compelled” testimony.108  If the Fifth Amendment only serves to protect against 
“compelled” or “coerced” testimony, proponents of admission argue that it would 
make no sense to exclude evidence of a defendant’s silence that may be probative 
of guilt and was not a response to government action.109  For various reasons, the 
Fifth,110 Ninth,111 and Eleventh112 Circuits ruled that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence is admissible as evidence of guilt during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.113 
V.  THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE FACTS OF STATE V. LOVEJOY 
A.  Compulsion  
Many courts that have ruled evidence of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
admissible as substantive evidence of guilt have relied on the notion that the Fifth 
Amendment applies only to government acts that compel the defendant to 
incriminate himself.114  Read this way, the government agent must affirmatively 
compel the defendant in some way in order for the statements gained by such 
action to be excluded.115  While the Fifth Amendment does state that an individual 
shall not be “compelled” to incriminate himself,116 the notion that compulsion only 
exists in situations of police or other government action is myopic and undermines 
the protections of the Amendment by ignoring the inherent intimidating nature of 
any contact with police.117 Specifically, any court’s decision that compulsion only 
                                                                                                     
 108. See e.g., United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the fifth 
amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination,” not simply any statement that a person being 
questioned makes to law enforcement.  Where Defendant’s silence was “neither induced by nor a 
response to any action by a government agent” the Fifth Amendment does not apply.). 
 109. See Eric Steven O’Malley, Note, Fifth Amendment at Trial, 89 GEO. L.J. 1598, 1599 (2001) 
(stating that the Fifth Amendment only protects against compelled communications); see also David S. 
Romantz, 38 IND. L.R. 1, 53 (2005) (“A suspect's responses made outside the context of an official 
interview . . . are immune from a Fifth Amendment challenge since they fall outside the coercive 
atmosphere inherent to a custodial interrogation.”).  
 110. See Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593 (holding that the defendant’s silence was not protected under the 
Fifth Amendment, as it was not in response to any governmental action.  The Fifth Amendment does not 
prevent prosecutorial comment on all silence or communication made by a defendant, but merely those 
instances which are in response to government compulsion.). 
 111. United States v. Beckman, 298 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The use of a defendant’s pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence is permissible as impeachment evidence and as evidence of substantive 
guilt.”).  
 112. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Jenkins for the proposition 
that the government may comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, but making no 
distinction between the use of such silence for impeachment and its use during the prosecution’s case-
in-chief). 
 113. Stewart, supra note 64, at 197-98. 
 114. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 201 n.108 (citing United States v. Olinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066-
67 (9th Cir. 1998); Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593). 
 115. See Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593 (stating that in order for a defendant’s pre-arrest statement to 
inadmissible, such a statement must be in “response to . . . action by a government agent”). 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 117. See Rachael A. Van Cleave, Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There 
No End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 214 (1988) 
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exists when an agent of the government affirmatively acts in such a way that the 
defendant would not have said anything had the agent not coerced the statement 
chips away at the protections offered by the Fifth Amendment and by Miranda.118  
Any such doctrine encourages situations wherein a suspect with knowledge that his 
silence can be used against him in court feels compelled to speak with police and 
forfeit his constitutional protection even in the absence of explicit government 
misconduct.119 If a court does not recognize this as compulsion, then a defendant is 
forced to choose between the lesser of two evils, thus creating a compulsory 
environment even in the absence of government action.120 
In Griffin v. California, the Court held that a prosecutor violated the Fifth 
Amendment by improperly commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify at 
trial.121  The Court issued what would come to be known as the “penalty doctrine,” 
stating that comment[ing] on a defendant’s exercise of his right to not testify at trial 
“is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.”122  While 
the asserted violation in Griffin occurred at trial, the doctrine should be extended to 
apply to the facts of Lovejoy and to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in general.  
Knowledge on the part of the accused that exercising his right to remain silent in 
response to police questioning could be used at trial is every bit as coercive as 
“traditional” police coercion.123  If the defendant knows that his silence can be used 
against him at trial, he is substantially more likely to forfeit his constitutional 
protection against self-incrimination.124  Even if the defendant does not know that 
his silence can be used against him at trial, he is in essence still penalized for 
exercising the right to remain silent, thus leading to the same harm found in 
Griffin.125  
In addition, while there is some debate as to the wisdom of using Miranda as 
the dividing line for purposes of the admissibility of statements in all cases,126 the 
Miranda warnings today are so “embedded in routine police practice” that they 
                                                                                                     
(stating that when an officer approaches a citizen, the citizen is likely to comply because they feel that 
they cannot simply ignore the officer). 
 118. See e.g., Notz, supra note 66, at 1033 (stating that allowing the substantive use of pre-arrest 
silence will allow encourage “improper police behavior” and undercut the adversarial system); see also 
Skrapka, supra note 67, at 398 (“The essence of the privilege [against self-incrimination] is not to 
compel a criminal defendant to be a witness against himself, and the privilege is significantly impaired 
when the prosecution is permitted to use post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt in its case-
in-chief.”). 
 119. See Patrick, supra note 69, at 935-36; see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980). 
 120. See Patrick, supra note 69, at 935-36.  
 121. 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965). 
 122. Id. at 614. 
 123. See Notz, supra note 66, at 1013 (arguing that in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings that the 
Fifth Amendment’s protections extend beyond the courtroom, its protections would become 
meaningless if they did not extend to the pre-arrest stage). 
 124. See Notz, supra note 66, at 1034. 
 125. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (stating that comment on a defendant’s failure to testify is an 
unconstitutional penalty imposed for “by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege”). 
 126. See e.g., Marc Scott Hennes, Note, Manipulating Miranda: United States v. Frazier and the 
Case-In-Chief Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1013, 1022 (2007) 
(contending that instead of “champion[ing] the idea that Fifth Amendment protections attach at the 
moment Miranda warnings are given, the Court could have focused on the “impeachment use of the 
testimony,” which raises “fewer constitutional concerns than case-in-chief use”). 
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“have become part of our national culture.”127  Thus, it is probable that a defendant 
will know his rights before having been read them.128  In light of this, and of the 
fact that Miranda warnings are a procedural safeguard meant to inform the accused 
of his rights and to give him a meaningful opportunity to exercise those rights,129 to 
hold that the accused may have his pre-Miranda silence used against him at trial 
penalizes him for knowing the law well enough to invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination before being read his rights.  Further, it serves to make it more likely 
that he will forfeit this constitutionally guaranteed protection.130  The Supreme 
Court would be acting arbitrarily in holding that implicit in the Miranda warnings 
is the expectation that one will not be punished for invoking one’s privilege against 
self-incrimination131 and that prior to the administration of the Miranda warnings 
any silence is fair game for admission at trial.132  To draw such an arbitrary line 
would be to scale back the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment in favor of 
a prophylactic tool that came into existence largely to illuminate the Amendment’s 
scope and to protect the accused.133  The circuit courts that have prohibited the use 
of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief have relied on an expansive interpretation of Griffin and 
have achieved the correct result.134 
Turning briefly to Lovejoy, had the Law Court ruled in favor of admission, it 
would have added a coercive element to every defendant’s exercise of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.135  Specifically, a defendant 
would have to remain silent with the knowledge that the prosecution could put 
words in his mouth—or more accurately, thoughts in his head—during trial.136 
                                                                                                     
 127. Skrapka, supra note 67, at 396 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000)). 
 128. Hennes, supra note 126, at 1035 (noting that empirical evidence supports the notion that 
Americans by-in-large know their Miranda rights). 
 129. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.”). 
 130. See Skrapka, supra note 67, at 397 (“[T]he Miranda warnings are not the source of the right to 
remain silent, but merely a means of protecting that right.”); see also Notz, supra note 66 at 1034 
(stating that allowing police to comment on a defendant’s silence at trial will make the defendant more 
likely to forfeit that right). 
 131. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
 132. See Skrapka, supra note 67, at 397.  If the Miranda warnings are simply a means of protecting 
an already existing right, it makes no sense to hold that their application is a necessary vehicle for 
asserting that right. 
 133. See Christopher Macchiaroli, To Speak or Not to Speak: Can Pre-Miranda Silence Be Used As 
Substantive Evidence of Guilt?, 33 CHAMPION 14, 20 (2009). 
 134. But see Notz, supra note 66, at 1015, 1035 (noting that the Supreme Court’s recent precedent 
places Griffin on “shaky ground,” and that the proper analysis may now be under the Jenkins 
“impermissible burden” test, which held that government practices are only barred where they place an 
“impermissible burden” on the exercise of constitutional rights). 
 135. Notz, supra note 66, at 1034 (stating that a defendant who knows his silence will be used 
against him will be much more likely to speak with police than one who believes his communications 
are protected). 
 136. See Maria Noelle Berger, Note, Defining the Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: 
Should Pre-Arrest Silence be Admissible as Substantive Evidence of Guilt?, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 
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B.  Concerns of Prejudice 
While Justice Stevens argued in his concurring opinion in Jenkins that 
questions of admission of pre-arrest silence turn solely on evidentiary 
considerations,137 there is a strong argument to be made that evidence of pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence is never probative enough to overcome concerns of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant.138  In fact, the Court in Doyle v. Ohio stated that “every 
post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous . . . .”139  There are many reasons why a 
defendant might choose to remain silent, including knowledge of his Miranda 
rights, “fear that his story may not be believed,”140 the desire to protect another,141 
or simply not hearing the question.142  These concerns apply equally to pre-arrest 
silence.  Thus, the probative value of offering evidence of silence at trial is very 
low.143   
In contrast, the potential for prejudice is significant.  While there may be a 
perfectly reasonable explanation for a defendant’s silence, the Fifth Amendment 
protects a defendant in his decision not to give that reason, and when a prosecutor 
is allowed to comment on a defendant’s silence, a jury is likely to accept the 
prosecutor’s explanation for the silence and attach far more significance to it than it 
might otherwise be reasonably afforded.144   
Turning to the facts in Lovejoy, the prosecutor at closing told the jury that 
“Lovejoy ‘never kept in contact’ and ‘never chose to call’ or come ‘up to Maine to 
clear up the charges in person.’”145  Under those circumstances, no reasonable juror 
could have been expected to conclude from Lovejoy’s silence anything other than 
the fact that he was guilty.  However, one could easily imagine a situation wherein 
the defendant was innocent of the crime but still did not wish to talk to the police.  
For example, the defendant could reasonably believe that the police would not 
believe his side of the story even if he told them.  However, once the evidence that 
Lovejoy did not return the detective’s phone calls was admitted at trial, it became 
highly unlikely that the jury would infer anything other than his guilt.  In addition, 
there was no physical evidence connecting Lovejoy to the crime.146  Thus, evidence 
of his pre-arrest silence was quite possibly the State’s most damning piece of 
evidence.  While some courts have held that the admission of such evidence, while 
                                                                                                     
1039-40 (1999) (stating that there are any number of reasons why a defendant would remain silent in 
response to police questioning, but that guilt is a very compelling option if offered at trial). 
 137. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 244 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 138. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 139. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). 
 140. Combs, 205 F.3d at 285 (noting also that pressuring a defendant to explain himself or suffer the 
consequences at trial would increase the likelihood of a defendant perjuring himself). 
 141. See Pettit, supra note 77, at 219. 
 142. See Pettit, supra note 77, at 219. 
 143. See Combs, 205 F.3d at 285-86 (“[P]ermitting the use of a defendant's prearrest silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt would greatly undermine the policies behind the privilege against self-
incrimination while adding virtually nothing to the reliability of the criminal process.”). 
 144. See id. 
 145. State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 8, 89 A.3d 1066. 
 146. Id. ¶ 28. 
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slightly prejudicial, is merely one part of a larger case,147 in cases such as Lovejoy, 
where the State has relatively little evidence other than the witness testimony of a 
few people, evidence of silence is likely to play a larger role and is thus more likely 
to result in prejudice to a defendant.  Thus, the probative value of the evidence was 
very low, and the evidence was extremely prejudicial.148  Because this specter of 
ambiguity is present at every trial, and because nothing short of exclusion can 
sufficiently mitigate the inherent risks of presuming facts from silence, such 
evidence should be categorically excluded. 
C.  The Case Against Using the Jenkins “Impermissible Burden” Test to Rule Pre-
Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence Admissible in the State’s Case-in-Chief 
As previously noted, many courts that have held pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence to be admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief have done so using 
Jenkins v. Anderson as a conduit.149  However, the Jenkins Court decided only that 
pre-arrest silence is available for use in impeachment at trial.150  The Court noted 
that “while such use clearly burdened the exercise of the privilege, the extent of the 
burden was not impermissible under the dictates of the Fifth Amendment.”151  
Rather than extending the Griffin “penalty doctrine” to cover silence used for 
impeachment purposes, the court in Jenkins stated that “the Constitution does not 
forbid ‘every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect 
of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.’”152  Rather, the Constitution 
forbids only those practices which impermissibly burden a constitutional right.153  
In determining whether a practice “impermissibly burdens” a constitutional right, 
the Jenkins Court set forth a balancing test that weighs “‘whether compelling the 
election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights 
involved’”154 against “the legitimacy of the challenged government practice.”155  
Thus, the relevant inquiry as to whether a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence is available as substantive evidence of guilt at trial is not whether a 
defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right results in a penalty at court,156 but 
whether and to what extent the government’s practice of using a defendant’s 
silence against him in its case-in-chief “impairs . . . any of the policies behind the 
rights involved [in the Fifth Amendment].”157 
While it may appear a small step between allowing use of a defendant’s silence 
at trial for impeachment purposes to using it during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, 
                                                                                                     
 147. See e.g. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that any error on 
the part of the prosecution in presenting evidence of defendant’s silence was harmless in light of the 
weight of evidence supporting his guilt). 
 148. See Pettit, supra note 77, at 196 (discussing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)). 
 149. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 200. 
 150. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). 
 151. Notz, supra note 66, at 1017 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238). 
 152. Notz, supra note 66, at 1018 (quoting Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236). 
 153. Notz, supra note 66, at 1018 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238). 
 154. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973)). 
 155. Id. at 238 (citing Chaffin v. Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973)). 
 156. See generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 157. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236. 
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the difference in the two applications is stark.  In the first instance, the defendant 
has “cast aside his cloak of silence” by choosing to testify at trial.158  Thus, it 
makes sense that the truth-seeking purpose of trial would allow his testimony to be 
called into question using evidence of his prior silence.159  Under the Jenkins 
balancing test, the policies behind the Fifth Amendment are not abrogated when a 
defendant chooses to open himself up for cross-examination because the 
government has a legitimate interest in facilitating the purpose underlying all trials: 
to discern the truth.160   But in a case where the defendant does not open himself up 
for cross-examination and yet is still subject to questioning about his pre-arrest 
silence, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is ripped from his 
hands, as the prosecutor is free to suggest that the defendant would have spoken 
were he not guilty.161   
With regard to pre-arrest silence, the Griffin “penalty doctrine” is a more 
appropriate doctrine to apply than the Jenkins “impermissible burden” test because 
where a defendant has not testified at trial, “the justification for treating him as any 
other witness [is] absent.”162  In addition, as noted above, the leap between using 
silence as evidence of impeachment and using it in the state’s case-in-chief is 
stark.163  In contrast, it would take but a small extension of Griffin to apply it to 
pre-arrest silence.164  Since the right to remain silent attaches before formal 
proceedings have been initiated, it follows that a defendant’s decision to remain 
silent prior to trial should also be protected.165  However, even under Jenkins a 
defendant’s choice to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination should never 
be available for the prosecution to use as substantive evidence of guilt during its 
case-in-chief.  Such a twisting of the protections provided in the Fifth Amendment 
negates the privilege against self-incrimination by putting the defendant in the 
impossible position of having to choose between having his silence or his 
testimony used against him at trial.166  Under Jenkins, an appropriate consideration 
in determining whether a constitutional right has been impermissibly burdened is 
“the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice.”167  Where a defendant 
has opened himself up to cross-examination the governmental interest in increasing 
the reliability of the practice is served.  However, when a defendant has made the 
                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 238. 
 159. See Notz, supra note 66, at 1027. 
 160. See Notz, supra note 66, at 1027. 
 161. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 199 (Stewart noted that one rationale for a prohibition on the use 
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 164. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).   
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decision not to take the stand in his defense, the analysis shifts entirely.168  In that 
instance, the Fifth Amendment’s protections should control to protect against the 
potentially damaging evidence that could otherwise be introduced.169 
As stated above, in the context of Lovejoy, the relevant test should be the 
Griffin “penalty doctrine.”170  Under this test, the admission of Lovejoy’s silence at 
trial during the prosecution’s case-in-chief was an impermissible penalty connected 
with the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.171  However, even 
under Jenkins, evidence of Lovejoy’s silence should not have been admitted, as 
admission of the silence would constitute an “impermissible burden” on the 
exercise of a constitutional right by undercutting the policies served by the Fifth 
Amendment, such as protection of the innocent and adherence to the adversarial 
system of justice.172   
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as evidence 
of consciousness of guilt in the state’s case-in-chief is difficult indeed.  There exist 
on both sides of the debate compelling reasons why such evidence should be 
admitted or excluded.  On one hand, there are a number of reasons why a defendant 
might want to remain silent prior to his arrest.173  On the other, there is an argument 
to be made that the Fifth Amendment simply does not attach to pre-arrest 
silence.174  The issue is especially difficult in light of the fact that silence can 
“mean” any number of things; it can be highly probative of guilt and of 
introversion, of shame and of fear.175  However, the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides that that no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”176  Because a defendant’s invocation 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutionally mandated protection, 
and because that invocation comes implicitly with the understanding that a 
defendant’s silence will not be used against him in any subsequent court 
proceedings,177 the Law Court correctly decided State v. Lovejoy.   
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